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In America a right-wing populist has sparked debate about the state of American democracy, while European
countries have increasing experience of populist radical right parties. The presence and popularity of these parties
raises significant questions about their consequences for democracy, democratic legitimacy, and political
participation. In a recent study, Tim Immerzeel and Mark Pickup examined the role of these parties for a specific
indicator of the quality of democracy: voter turnout. Based on an analysis of 33 European countries in the period
2002-2012, they show that the presence and popularity attracts some people to the polling booth, while demotivating
others.
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The rise of the populist radical right (PRR) in European democracies over the last three decades has attracted
extensive scientific and public debate. One focal point concerns the consequences of the PRR for democracy. Some
have claimed that the PRR constitutes a serious threat to democracy because its leaders employ a radical notion of
democracy that emphasises a homogenous ‘people’ and excludes minorities. However, others have noted that the
PRR actually correct democratic deficiencies by speaking to a large group of citizens disillusioned with mainstream
politicians and parties. These people, who feel that there is finally someone who listens to their grievances, may find
the way (back) to the polling booth, thus boosting general turnout numbers (cf. Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2012).
Although the question of whether the PRR constitutes a ‘threat or corrective’ to democracy is usually a normative
one, the question of whether there is a relationship between the popularity of the PRR and voter turnout can be
empirically tested. Does the PRR, indeed, play a role in encouraging or discouraging citizens to go to the polling
booth, and why? In our recent study, we address this question. Drawing upon different theories, such as electoral
competition (Franklin, 2004), we expect that a successful PRR party fosters voter turnout because it is a passionate
mobiliser that fulfills a watchdog function and reintroduces electoral competition. Additionally, we argue that the PRR
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will be especially successful in doing so among those who favor PRR policies: the less educated, the blue-collar
workers, the unemployed, the politically dissatisfied, and those with negative attitudes toward immigrants. In
addition, we develop a competing hypothesis that the PRR could inhibit voter turnout because it introduces a more
negative, hardened tone to the political debate that further triggers distrust toward politics, politicians and
democracy. We expect that this will especially discourage those who are new to democracy: whether it is young
voters in more established democracies, or Eastern Europeans.
Most importantly, our study shows that there is no general positive influence of PRR’s popularity on electoral turnout.
Despite the unique profile of the PRR as a populist, nativist contender and some anecdotal evidence that the PRR’s
electoral breakthroughs accompany rising turnout, these parties do not have the general positive impact on electoral
turnout that we had expected. In Western European countries, the PRR generally has no influence on electoral
turnout, whereas in Eastern European countries it has a negative effect. Hence, to speak of the PRR as ‘corrective
of democracy’ is—in terms of electoral turnout—a misunderstanding.
Yet, although the PRR does not have a generally positive influence on electoral turnout, the Western European PRR
do encourage some social groups to turn out for national elections. These groups are, however, not the people who
agree with the PRRs’ ideology. Rather, they seem to be the groups that are actually repelled by them: the more
highly educated Western Europeans who are more politically interested are more inclined to ‘keep the rascals out’.
Interestingly, in Eastern Europe, such positive effects on electoral turnout for those who oppose PRR ideology were
not found. In contrast, anti-PRR Eastern Europeans were actually strongly discouraged from voting with increasing
PRR popularity. Younger, more highly educated, non-blue collar workers and politically interested citizens were more
inclined to stay home at national election time when the PRR became more popular. We speculate that these East-
West differences may be caused by the fact that Eastern Europeans live in younger democracies and have less
experience with electoral competition than their Western European counterparts. Anti-PRR Western Europeans are
often socialised in a democratic regime where elections are accompanied by contentious political campaigns. They
may think of elections as a legitimate method of ‘protest’ against the PRR and thus turn out to vote (cf. Hirschman,
1970; Thomassen et al., 2014), whereas anti-PRR Eastern Europeans may interpret the PRR’s success as a
confirmation of their image of democracy, politics and politicians as being untrustworthy and corrupt. This results in
lower levels of electoral turnout (Brooks & Geer, 2007; Kahn & Kenney, 1999).
Altogether, our findings underline the claim that the PRR poses a threat to democracy especially in East-European
countries where young people in particular are negatively affected by the success of the PRR. If young people do
not vote, their interests may be underrepresented in the legislature, and they will be more likely to become habitual
non-voters (e.g. Plutzer, 2002). In the short term, this leads to lower levels of turnout among youngsters. In the long
term, this younger generation could pass down their habitual nonvoting to the next generation, which eventually
leads to even lower levels of turnout across the electorate (cf. Blais & Rubenson, 2013). Hence, we conclude that for
Eastern Europe, one should be concerned about the popularity of the PRR because it seems to discourage an
important part of the electorate from turning out at elections.
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This blog is based on the authors’ recent Electoral Studies article “Populist radical right parties mobilizing ‘the
people’? The role of populist radical right success in voter turnout”. Read the full article here.
This post represents the views of the authors and not those of Democratic Audit UK or the LSE. Please read our
comments policy before posting.
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